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Abstract 
The critical damage to the Fukushima nuclear plant in March 2011 triggered more than nuclear debris. 
The explosions at Fukushima arguably blew up a few myths: ‘cleanness’, ‘safety’, ‘cheapness’, which 
decades of propaganda had successfully created and maintained, and provoked noticeable cracks in the 
hitherto hegemonic discourse on nuclear power. This paper offers a few observations on the discursive 
positioning of various social actors in the weeks and months following the disaster, from the pro-nuclear 
camp of industry officials to the anti-nuclear grass-root movements, and in the fora of institutional news 
media and social media. I maintain that the latter at least contributed to shake public consciousness, and 
reignited big political issues such as the public’s right to information, the accountability of industry 
players, the rights of local communities, etc. Equally importantly, through the production of alternative 
‘packages’ of images, metaphors and narratives, they facilitated the reshaping of the whole discursive 
space surrounding the nuclear and increased the currency of an alternative discourse, which has the 
potential to have dramatic and long-lasting effects on Japanese social and cultural values.  
 
1. Introduction 
The earthquake, and the consequent tsunami, that hit Japan in 2011 caused not just telluric shocks and 
aftershocks, but arguably the biggest psychological blow in Japan’s post-war history, forcing it to a deep 
and painful reflection about the sustainability of its lifestyle, and the social, political, economic, 
environmental implications of its future policies.  
The “transition” alluded to in the title of the conference where this paper was first presented is 
interpreted here as the transition from one type of dominant discourse to another, i.e. from the 
fundamentally unquestioned pro-nuclear discourse that Japan adopted in the 50s and that carried on until 
11 March 2011, to the much more sceptical, critical, multifaceted, articulate discourse on the nuclear of 
the post-Fukushima era. I examine this discourse from the viewpoint of the language that constitutes it, 
and through various semiotic ‘packages’, in a variety of channels from mainstream newsmedia to 
grass-root movements’ posters and blogs, youtube videos and the industry’s digital archives, all public 
—hence social— acts of communication. I take these semiotic products to be instrumental in the 
construction, the maintenance of, or the challenge to specific ‘discourses’ about nuclear power, but not in 
any direct or mechanical way. The meaning of these signs follows patterned ways of thinking or talking 
about nuclear issues, but they also interact in complex ways with the social, historical, cultural context, 
and with particular ideological stances that individuals take vis-à-vis them.  
Talking of ideologies may suggest that what I examine here are just different ways, some biased 
perhaps, in which individuals evaluate the same facts, but look at them from different positions of interest. 
While I do maintain that different positions of interest are what determine different ‘readings’ of the same 
facts, in the case of the Fukushima disaster the very establishing of the mere facts (if they ever were 
established) carried such gigantic potential implications —e.g. the need for large-scale evacuations, the 
danger of mass panic, and the like— that blind faith in or defence of an ideology were tested to the limits. 
I argue that Fukushima constituted an instance of what Paul Chilton (1987) calls a "critical discourse 
moment", which shakes current beliefs of language users and make previously taken-for-granted 
discourse visible, and susceptible to re-evaluation.  
The Fukushima problem exemplifies several important issues, some of which have linguistic 
implications: for example, the public’s right to information and the government’s and private companies’ 
duty of accountability, the question of authority over and access to scientific information, the unequal 
distribution of the power to communicate, etc., i.e. ultimately issues of democracy, and also how these are 
affected by new information technologies. Access to the truth regarding nuclear issues, it could be argued, 
is intrinsically restricted —even before being subject to censorship— because of the specialized 
knowledge that it presupposes, including linguistic terminology, which is the purview of a restricted 
community of users. Those who wanted to keep up to date with the events unfolding in Fukushima had to 
learn, or at least familiarize themselves with language that the ordinary layperson was unlikely to have 
encountered before: Gray, Sievert, beckerels, naibu hibaku (内部被曝＝体内被曝 internal exposure). But 
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the inaccessibility of specialist terminology was not the only linguistic hurdle that common citizens had 
to struggle with. They had to contend more broadly with a whole hegemonic discourse, which construed, 
over many decades, the question of nuclear power as a technological rather than social issue, an economic 
rather than philosophical issue.   
Nuclear discourse, as Allan (1989:17) notes, “contains fragmentary traces of other, often 
contradictory, discourses (those of Nation, Sovereignty, Duty, Geo-politics, Economics, Defence, 
Deterrence, Peace, and Security […]).” This paper cannot aim to provide an exhaustive account of the 
cultural history of nuclear power in Japan or engage in depth with these macro-themes, and my account 
will be necessarily sketchy and partial (regrettably, no account can be provided of TV coverage), but I 
will try to provide a brief outlook of diverse, competing, and occasionally paradoxically permeable 
narratives on the nuclear which the critical ‘Fukushima moment’ mobilized and with which the future 
Japan will have to engage. As Gamson and Modigliani (1989:1) note, “nuclear power, like every policy 
issue, has a culture. There is an ongoing discourse that evolves and changes over time, providing 
interpretations and meanings for relevant events.” Through some of the clusters of “metaphors, 
catchphrases, visual images, moral appeals, and other symbolic devices that characterize this discourse” I 
hope to provide a glimpse of the massive cultural shock that Japan experienced in the aftermath of the 
Fukushima disaster.   
 
2. The post-war nuclear discourse 
Japan’s enthusiastic embracing of a pro-nuclear policy since the late ’50s is puzzling to most observers, 
given that Japan was the very (and only) country to have experienced the horror of the military use of 
nuclear power—Hiroshima and Nagasaki being the primal “critical discourse moment” on the nuclear 
(Chilton 1987:16). Some historians however have recently argued that Japan’s first steps in becoming a 
‘nuclear nation’ were taken immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when its 
government yielded to US interest and utilized victims as subjects of research, rather than address them as 
victims. It was only in 1957 that the A-Bomb Victims Medical Care Law was enacted (Sasamoto 1999:89, 
91: Hook 1987:35); until then the Japanese government had just stared at the results of various scientific 
studies on the biological effects of the atomic bombs. No significant anti-nuclear position existed in 
occupied Japan, mostly because of the secrecy about and the high specialization required by nuclear 
matters, so that the debate remained quite unknown outside of physicist’s circles (Nakayama 2005:336). 
An important turning point in the global discourse on nuclear power was Eisenhower’s speech 
“Atom for Peace” at the United Nations in 19531. Addressing both domestic and international concerns, it 
attempted to reshape the US’s democratic credentials after the bombing of Japan (and to distance itself, at 
the same time, from the undemocratic Soviet Union) and, crucially, broke the association of the atom with 
war (Jasanoff and Kim 2009:126 ff.), invoking a peaceful future where the atom would be controlled for 
civil use, expertise would be shared globally, and this new form of energy would be capable of sustaining 
rather than threatening life. A budget for nuclear development (tabled by the then member of the diet 
Yasuhiro Nakasone) was passed by the Japanese diet in 1954 (Yoshioka 2005:80 and 2005a:109 ff.). 
The ‘atom for peace’ vision was congenial to Japan, in search of energy sources other than the coal, 
which had sustained it during the war, and the oil shocks of the ‘70s further incited a major nuclear 
construction program (Vivoda 2012:7). Nationwide concern about nuclear power began arguably with the 
Lucky Dragon incident (the US test at the Bikini Atoll in 1954; Nakayama 2005:338). Although the 
global debate about the safety of nuclear power that had begun in the 1960s did eventually spread to 
Japan2 (Yoshioka 2011:155, Yoshioka 2005:117), and in spite of the growing local opposition during the 
‘70s, including the wave of concern that the Three-Mile Island accident of 1976 had sent around the 
world, the government embarked in an ambitious plan of construction of nuclear plants, which 
mushroomed through the ‘80s. The discursive arena had been prepared, arguably, by the progressive 
marginalization of anti-nuclear sentiment in the political discourse. Hook (1984) for example, details the 
birth of the metaphor of “nuclear allergy” in the Japanese newsmedia to refer to the Japanese people’ 
                                                      
1 But see Gamson and Modigliani 1989:12 on the remarkably quick reaction, already in the autumn of 1945, in the 
American media, by proponents of a discourse about peaceful uses of the atom. 
2 Particularly responsible for this were the activities of the Zengenren (全国原子力科学技術家連合会 Zenkoku 
genshiryoku kagaku gijustuka rengoukai ), mostly composed of young scientists and technicians, the Gensuikin（原水
爆禁止日本国民会), networking across all Japanese anti-nuclear groups, the birth of the Hangenpatsu undoo 
zenkoku renrakukai (All-Japan liaison center for anti-nuclear movements) and the CNIC (Citizen’s Nuclear 
Information Centre, 原子力資料情報室), (Yoshioka 2005:117). 
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particular sensitivity about nuclear matters, and notes how the nature of the metaphor (coupled with the 
absence of an equally powerful countermetaphor) branded anti-nuclear stances as “abnormal”, 
“patological” elements of a healthy body-culture in need of a “cure”.  
An extremely successful public relation campaign managed to transform the public’s perception of 
nuclear power from enemy to friend. This major feat was achieved through the use of a few discursive 
mechanisms: the systematic disassociation of nuclear power for military and for civil uses which had 
already featured in the US “atom for peace” campaign, and together with this the promotion of other key 
themes, which later events arguably exposed as myths, such as safety, energy security, cleanness, 
cheapness (Koike 2011, Gamson and Modigliani 1989).  
 
2.1. Public relations campaigns  
The first of these themes —safety— is prominent in TEPCO’s 1987 promotional film on the Fukushima 
power plant, which had begun operations in 1971. Five minutes into the film, we have heard the word 
anzen (safe) three times. As the film shows the insertion of fuel rods in the reactor and the critical point of 
fission is reached for the first time, the narration proudly declares that “the […] light of the atom is lit, 
greeting the dawn of a new form of energy”. We are shown prospering local communities, children 
growing up “in great health and vigour”. Others have noted the significance of the musical packaging: 
“various musical melodies that suggest harmony between the nuclear plant and the environment runs [sic] 
throughout the background of the video. […] On the other hand, music evocative of a James Bond movie 
also cues in scenes that seem to suggest awe of the scale of the human technological and architectural 
accomplishment”3. What we see at work here is a whole symbolic package, to use Gamson and 
Modigliani’s (1989) terminology, one that can be labelled as “progress”. While allowing a moderate 
degree of variable positions within it (e.g. on the type of reactor that should be built), the “package frames 
the nuclear power issue in terms of the society's commitment to technological development and economic 
growth” (1989:4). A ‘package’ has a wider cognitive appeal than specific statements, and can withstand, 
by incorporating them within its logic, apparently countering events such as nuclear accidents.  
The “progress” package appears to have been (and to be) considerably resilient; nevertheless, 
especially after the Chernobyl accident of 1986, the government and nuclear industry felt the need for a 
sustained campaign, revamped again in the 90s, as can be evinced by the promotion video commissioned 
in 19934 by the agency today called Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)5, and distributed to facilities 
such as atomic energy museums, or the visitor centers of nuclear power stations. The lead character is 
Pluto-kun, representing the radioactive element used in the nuclear industry, saddened by the bad 
reputation he accrued for having been first used for military purposes. He wants everyone to know the 
real story of Plutonium (“hontoo no hanashi wo kiite kudasai”), so—on the sugary soundtrack of Twinkle 
Twinkle Little star—Pluto-kun attempts to rectify the many misunderstandings about him.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Pluto-kun promotion video 
 
                                                      
3 http://teach311.wordpress.com/author/remmid/ 
4 The video was available at the time of the conference, but has since been removed “due to a copyright claim by the 
JAEA”. A synopsis and some snapshots are still available at 
http://pinktentacle.com/2011/03/cute-pluto-kun-cartoon-dispels-plutonium-fears/ 
5 Then Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation. 
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First—he says—it is very unlikely that plutonium could fall in the wrong hands, as facilities are 
absolutely secure6. It is thought to be poisonous and trigger cancer, but if it touches your skin, it is not 
absorbed. Only in case it enters the body through a wound, it collects to your lymph nodes and it can 
spread to tissues and organs. Also, although there is some evidence that ingesting radium has caused 
cancer, so far—he continues—there is absolutely no evidence that Plutonium does. Some are concerned 
about what would happen if some bad guys threw plutonium in a river and if you drank that water for a 
long time. Your body—he reassures us—would just get rid of it naturally. 
  
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Plutonium is safe if not injected in the bloodstream, or inhaled 
 
Pluto-kun is sad, because only his dangerous sides are emphasized and he has become an instrument of 
threat (odoshi). Scary notions of radiation or of nuclear bombing get to the fore and get in the way, 
because of a lack of correct knowledge (“tadahii chishiki ga fusoku shiteite…”). The new power plants7 
are far more efficient than before, and they make humans’ future full of bright hope (“ningenno shorai wa 
akarui kiboo ni michita mono desu”). If we approach him with a peace-loving and warm heart he is not at 
all scary or dangerous (“heiwana atatakai kokoro de tsukiatte kudasareba, bokuwa, kesshite osoroshii 
monodemo, kikenn na mono demo arimasen”), he will deliver an inexhaustible (tsukiru koto no nai) 
amount of energy, and we will be able to count on him (“tayori ni naru nakama nanodesu”). 
It is difficult not to note the same packaging of ‘nuclear as progress’ of the Fukushima plant’s 
promotional video of 20 years earlier and the quite blatant propagandistic tenor: not only because the 
information provided could appear doubtful even at the time (how many of us would feel safe in drinking 
plutonium-polluted water?), but also because of the insistence on correct knowledge, which assumes only 
one type of admissible knowledge and obscures the ideological nature of the pro-nuclear stance; the 
emphasis on rationality (scientific evidence is quoted as uncontroversial supportive evidence), which 
disqualifies emotional commentaries; the eerie mantra of a bright future built on nuclear power.  
Also, what is arguably particularly Japanese is not just the use of anime for the purpose of 
indoctrination, but also the language of “cuteness”: soft colours, a child’s voice over, all the more 
grotesque in light of the recent disaster, but, as we will see later, a recurrent aesthetic trope in many other 
forms of nuclear discourse.  
 
2.2. Manufacturing Consensus 
In spite of considerable and growing opposition to Japan’s nuclear policy, especially from the 90s onward, 
the discourse in the industry never substantially changed, and the same, evidently successful ideas were 
repackaged and reproduced time and again. If anything, the discourse increasingly emphasised the theme 
of cleanness, which in fact appears to be so powerful as to charm even environmentalist campaigners 
worldwide8. Ironically, the “progress” package, which resonates with the larger cultural theme of 
                                                      
6 Interestingly, the theme of nuclear material getting in the “wrong hands” is still a major concern for citizens in the 
2002 UK when asked an opinion about nuclear waste disposal (Bickerstaff et al. 2008:157)  
7 Pluto-kun refers here to Monju, the Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture power plant, which will suffer accidents in 1995 and 
2010. The ‘newly born’ character Monju-kun will be mentioned in section 5. 
8 See here the environmentalist George Monbiot’s statement that the Fukushima disaster changed his mind and 
turned him into a supporter of nuclear technology: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/21/pro-nuclear-japan-fukushima  
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technological progress and mastery over nature, engulfed an issue more peculiar to the “countertheme” 
(Gamson and Modigliani 1989:5) of ecological sustainability. Smart sponsors (“usually organizations, 
employing professionals specialists whose daily jobs bring them into contact with journalists”, 1989:7) 
managed this considerable feat, which exemplifies the complexity of the nuclear discourse at a time 
where the simple dualism between atoms for war vs. atoms for peace is no longer viable.  
The leaflet Consensus9, produced by Japan’s Federation of Electric Power Companies (Denki 
Jigyoo Rengookai) offers a notable example of the continuity of the progress package. Let us look at the 
cluster of various semiotic signs, at both levels of text (the message’s content) and layout (the design), 
which convey the federation’s message.    
 
 
 
FIGURE 3: front and back cover of the 2011 issue of the leaflet Consensus.  
 
Before we get to the content, the leaflet’s design itself strikes us as accessible and captivating, far 
removed from the ‘dry’ layout of scientific publishing material; the logos at the back of the leaflet index 
the company’s environmental concerns (left hand side in Figure 3), ‘certifying’ that the leaflet is printed 
with 100% recycled paper, vegetable oil ink, and a “waterless technique”. This symbolic reference to 
environmental concern is reinforced by the inclusion, in the ‘Questions & Answers’ that organize the 
content, of the theme of cleanness, and the presentation of nuclear power as the ‘clean’ alternative to 
fossil fuel, for it arguably “reduces CO2 emissions” (a myth consistently contested by many anti-nuclear 
scientists like Koide who notes that the government has recently begun to qualify this statement—as do 
the Consensus leaflets—by saying that nuclear plants “do not generate CO2 at the time of energy 
production (発電時)”. In fact a great amount of CO2 is generated in the extraction, transportation and 
transformation of uranium, and the plants’ maintenance (Koike 2011:114 ff.)10.   
 
                                                      
9  The first publication I could trace was in 2009, the latest in 2012, downloadable at: 
http://www.fepc.or.jp/about_us/pr/sonota/1215332_1511.html. Apart from the opening—an apology for the 
inconvenience caused to the local communities and to the Japanese public, reassurances about the industry’s 
commitment to the restoration of secure facilities and public trust— the latest edition is predictably filled by sobering 
information about the Fukushima events and the subsequent (current) measures of containment, but shows little 
variation in content and style. It still maintains the ‘user friendly’ tone of previous editions in its use of questions 
posed in child-talk plain forms such as “genshiryoku hatsudensho tte doko ni aru no?” (where are the nuclear 
plants?). 
10 This has become a powerful argument also in the debate in other countries: Bickerstaff, et al. (2008:145) talk of a 
“a new strand of political debate around energy policy, which reframes nuclear power as part of the solution to the 
need for low-carbon energy options.” And as noted in footnote 8, some environmentalists were the first to defend 
nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster, in the spirit of the “green nukes” movement. (cf. Lisa Lynch in American 
Literature Ecocritic Issue, available at spectrum.library.concordia.ca/974944/1/BeRadiatedFINAL.pdf).  
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FIGURE 4: Consensus: nuclear energy helps reduce CO2.  
  
The other themes of arguable concern—energy security, safety—are also still present: security-wise, the 
leaflet explains that Japan, being a resource-poor country, needs to be as self-reliant as possible. With 
regards to safety (the word ‘safe’ [anzen安全] is again a mantra repeated 50 times in the 16 pages leaflet), 
it explains that the amount of radiation that can leak from reprocessing plants is far lower than that we 
receive from natural sources. 
While the emphasis on the willingness to engage in a dialogue with the public (see FIGURE 5, 
or the very publication’s title) or undergo democratic processes of public scrutiny (for example, by means 
of regular meetings with local communities) appears to conform to traditional Japanese forms of 
decision-making, and moreover, to respond to a very contemporary demand for transparency and 
accountability, the underlying discourse regarding knowledge has hardly changed at all: the public needs 
to be ‘educated’ by scientists and governments, and once correct information has been disseminated, they 
will overcome their misplaced mistrust. Once again, not only does this view uniquely legitimize scientific 
knowledge and hence disqualifies as ignorance any argument based on concerns other than those of a 
positivist science (e.g. security issues such as the militarization required by the technology, political 
issues surrounding the relation between the beneficiaries of energy production and the communities in the 
plants’ backyards, environmental issues around the disposal of nuclear waste, etc.), it also deceivingly 
presents the scientist’s stance as monolithic, uncontroversial, and unquestioned.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 5: Consensus: “you said, we did”. 
 
But what of this concern with transparency and accountability when the Fukushima crisis hit Japan? The 
domestic and international audiences’ demand of detailed information in the immediate aftermath of the 
accident clashed with two competing hurdles: an intrinsic one, to do with the subject matter – the 
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specialized language of nuclear science, cryptic to lay audiences – and a political and social one – the 
need to maintain public order.  
 
2.3. TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) 
At the time of the conference, 7 months after the disaster, uncertainty still reigned about what really 
happened at the nuclear plant; the official versions fed to the public were questioned, and many openly 
criticized the government and TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company東京電力株式会社) for failing to 
provide transparent and reliable information. Many of TEPCO’s early statements later appeared to be 
utterly false (such as the denial of explosions), many appeared to be subtle semantic exercises. Early 
releases on their website (no longer available) for example reported that the amount of nuclear fallout 
posed “no immediate danger for (human) health” (tadachini kenkooni eikyoowo oyobasu ryoo dewa 
arimasen), as if the delayed harm to human beings typical of nuclear radiation were not equally 
concerning. No particularly strong conclusion could of course be drawn from this if cracks in proper 
communication were merely a feature of the first, confusing, days. But time and again over the following 
months, the public was exposed to contradictions and ambiguities, and telling euphemisms (which 
Chilton considers linguistic devices typically “oriented to the suppression or the evasion of reality”, 
serving “primarily dissimulation”, 1987:15), which added to the sense of confusion and uncertainty, and 
the populace’s fear and anxiety.  
Together with communiqués on TV channels and press conferences, TEPCO responds to the 
public demand for information by regularly updating—and adjusting—its website. Ironically, among the 
webpages suspended until further notice (kurashi to sorushon, ’life solutions’, and ‘employment 
opportunities’), is that labelled “manabu/shiru/tanoshimu” (learning, knowing, enjoying). To this day in 
December 2012 the page has not been reinstated (although it carries an apology note for the 
inconvenience and concern [gomeiwaku to goshinpai] caused to society following the accident) clearly 
betraying the uncertain status of what could be learned, known, or enjoyed when something goes wrong.    
The site starts accumulating multimedial information, including pdf files archives, press 
conference videos, minute illustrations of the current site’s set up, functional descriptions of pieces of 
equipment, real-time reports of single operations, and a live camera on the four reactors. Their press 
releases are dry, concise and purportedly fact-based (disputable as the facts may be), but in a few weeks, 
conceivably in order to deflect accusations of cynicism and self-interest, the website begins to include 
interactional texts such as apologies or condolences. On its homepage and extensively elsewhere, TEPCO 
announces wakariyasui setsumei (comprehensible explanations), a reminder of the schism between those 
who know and those who do not, and, as the most cynical view would have it, a convenient pretext for 
bending notions of transparency. However, this exceptional amount of information suddenly reverberating 
out of TEPCO under increasing pressure created in fact a kind of smoke curtain, and, important as it all 
was, still failed to convince the public – and equally the media and some monitoring agencies – that such 
accounts were either reliable or relevant. For example, an article on 18 October by the Mainichi Shinbun, 
reporting on the roadmap unveiled by government and TEPCO in order to contain the crippled reactors at 
the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant, called that roadmap unconvincing, as “the criteria used to 
thrash out the work schedule are vague and ambiguous”, and “failed to show any direction on the timing 
of lifting of evacuation advisories”. Moreover, the paper notes that self-assured assessments by TEPCO 
officials (“there is no problem because the melted fuel is sufficiently cooled down by water injection from 
above”; bp’s italics) once again were contradicted by Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) 
officials, who more cautiously stated “we will discuss [the roadmap’s] validity from now on.” 
Anti-nuclear scientists pointed out that rigorous assessments of these claims were impossible, because 
TEPCO simply did not release raw data.  
Some social scientists contend that “against the common view that risk perception is largely an 
artifact of media attention or relatively uninformed or emotional public reactions, the social science 
literature consistently shows that knowledge—such as scientific information or industry 
information—has no consistent effect on risk perceptions (Parkins and Halusa 2011:6), which is instead a 
function of the interplay of psychological, social, historical, political and cultural factors. They also 
maintain that “perhaps even more importantly, social trust is consistently observed to be influential. […] 
Where citizens judge the regulators and actors involved in nuclear power to be trustworthy, risk 
perception is likely to be lower. Conversely, where trusting relationships have been compromised, either 
by a history of regulatory failure, a sketchy industrial track record or by other challenges to 
trustworthiness, then the public is likely to judge nuclear power to be a more risky endeavor.” (ibid. 
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2011:7). This seems precisely the stage we are observing Japan to be in; the institutional response to the 
Fukushima incident has irrevocably eroded the trustworthiness of the Japanese government and energy 
regulators and with it the hegemonic authority of the whole discourse of safety, cleanness and economy. 
Koike Hiroaki, a prominent anti-nuclear engineer, titles his June 2011 book Genpatsu no uso—The 
nuclear lie(s).  
 
3. Discourse in the anti-nuclear camp 
How does all this compare with the discourse of anti-nuclear institutions? How do antagonist movements 
conceptualize nuclear power, how do they speak to their audiences, what narratives do they invoke? Let’s 
start with a long-established antinuclear organization, the Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC: 
http://www.cnic.jp/). 
CNIC is an anti-nuclear public interest organization born in Tokyo in 1975, certified as a 
Non-Profit Organization (NPO) in 1999. The centre gathers information from both government and 
industry publications but also mass media and the internet, and disseminates this information through 
newsletters in Japanese (fee-based) and in English (free and available online, cf. FIGURE 6). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6: CNIC’s bimonthly newsletter Nuke info Tokyo, September/October 2011 issue 
 
The discourse of an NPO must cater not only to the needs of those among its constituents who already 
have a clear anti-nuclear ideological stance, but also of those who are yet to be convinced. This requires a 
particular effort not only to get access to the means of mass communication, but also to achieve 
‘credibility’, in the face of the decades of hegemony of pro-nuclear discourse, and to overcome the 
constant threat of marginalization (Allan 1989). As we noted before, where the dominant discourse has 
been that of positivist “science”, a humanistic discourse which attributes primacy to human needs, 
subjective experience, moral and ethical issues, is not necessarily effective. Where the socially acceptable 
discourse is that of rationality, emotionality can become a liability. While rejecting a purely ‘scientific’, 
rationalist, efficiency-driven logic, institutions like CNIC have to strike a balance. They must alternate 
sharp scientific analyses and commentaries and more intimate, personal histories of common citizens. 
Interestingly, CNIC too construes its activities as the provision of public education, which turns the 
dominant discourse on its head and claims authority over information.  
Scientific analyses (often authored by former pro-nuclear scientists) often challenge the very 
frames regulating nuclear discourse and the subtle semantic exercises that seamlessly maintain it. For 
example, in the July/August 2011 issue, the cover piece titled: “TEPCO will do anything to maintain the 
'unforeseeable' theory” argues (based on an alternative reading of technical data released by TEPCO), that 
all of TEPCO’s communication strategy is oriented to covering up damage possibly caused by the 
earthquake, rather foreseeable in Japan, by attributing it to the exceptional and ‘unforeseeable’ tsunami 
that followed, conscious that the possibility of ‘foreseeableness’ would shake “the very foundations of the 
safety of nuclear power in ‘earthquake country Japan.’”11. 
                                                      
11 page 1, issue 143, available at http://www.cnic.jp/english/newsletter/index.html#2011 
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The same 143 issue juxtaposes to this a piece on Atsuko Ogasawara, the owner of some plots 
of land near the town of Ohma (northern Honshu) lying on the very spot where a nuclear power plant is 
under construction, and the last resident still determined to oppose it. Atsuko is presented as bright and 
cheerful but “often filled with emotions and moved to tears when talking in public”, a common individual, 
segregated by the construction plans and reduced to a lonely struggle. Pieces like this, and many others on 
the website, describing the daily experiences of ordinary citizens, video-accounts of families of evacuees, 
or updates on the workers at the damaged plants, provide not only an anchoring point for the wider 
population to relate to the nuclear debate, but also demonstrate the struggle over the discursive 
construction of ‘nuclear power’, and challenge it by construing it not only as a scientific issue, but one 
with huge human implications. In fact it is these accounts, feeding the debate themes related to personal 
experiences, which are important to the construction of alternative ‘packages’ such as the costliness, at 
the individual level, of the nuclear choice, juxtaposed to the ‘package’ of global cost-effectiveness that 
drives the pro-nuclear discourse.   
Atsuko’s case also highlights another important issue, which I will return to later: the unequal 
distribution of the power to communicate (Allan 1987, Van Dijk 1995:12). Atsuko’s plot is accessible 
only through a one-kilometer long pathway, unpaved and fenced on both sides by the nuclear company, 
and her log-house is not visible by the neighbors. Atsuko’s antinuclear action consists in requesting 
supporters to make her visible, by writing her postcards and forcing a postman to tread the path to her 
place.  
Like the language of CNIC’s newsletter, that of anti-nuclear activists and demonstrators has 
often deployed terminology with powerful emotional resonance. The term hibakusha was reportedly used 
at public rallies, and by the chair of the Hiroshima Prefecture Atomic Bomb Victims’ Organization (広島
県原爆被害者団体協議会) Tsuboi Hirao (reader’s letter to Asahi Shinbun 27 August 2011). The latter 
provocatively stated that the Fukushima’s hibakusha (被曝者, victims of radiation exposure) were just the 
same as the Hiroshima and Nagasaki’s hibakusha (被爆者, victims of atomic bombs). Such play on the 
homophone, in the context of the successful narrative that disassociated military and civil uses of the 
atom, and of the long-term struggle over a political, rather than physical, definition of the term (Hook 
1987:39), is clearly subversive. The term predictably never appeared in TEPCO’s announcements, who 
chose far less iconic designations, such as hisai sareta minasama (被災された皆様, disaster-struck 
populace), higaisha (被害者, sufferers, victims) or the even more circumlocutory hinan sarete iru 
katagata (避難されている方々, evacuees). Likewise, novelist Murakami Haruki’s use, in his prize 
acceptance speech in Barcelona on 9 June 2011, of the term kakuno (核の) to refer to genshiryoku 
(nuclear power) was noted by a Japan Times’ correspondent12 for its deliberate evocation of war-time 
lingo. 
What struck observers inside and outside Japan in the months following the disaster was the 
increased dynamism of the civil society and the increased visibility of social actors far more critical of the 
establishment’s line than the mainstream Japanese political scene commonly granted. I argue that the 
increasingly anti-nuclear stance of these movements (for it would be questionable to call it a movement) 
was at least reinforced by social media and internet resources such as Twitter, Facebook, Youtube, social 
blogging websites such as Tumblr., etc. These new channels offered anti-nuclear voices an opportunity to 
overcome the deafening media silence about grass-root anti-nuclear discourse. I will return to these in 
section 5, after a brief foray in media discourse. 
 
4. The media 
A review of the media coverage provided by four major national newspapers and a regional newspaper 
between March and November 2011 (Satoh 2012:37) records the total number of words devoted to the 
demonstrations in Tokyo as follows: Mainichi: 12,066; Tokyo Shimbun: 11,955; Asahi: 4,517; Yomiuri 
686; Nikkei 670. Tellingly, Mainichi and Asahi devoted more space to the March demonstration in 
Germany than the one in Tokyo. Of course, it is not the case that the traditional news media only 
showcased pro-nuclear discourse. However, they were far from providing a fair or neutral playing field. 
As Gamson and Modigliani describe similar circumstances when they note that (1989:7) “in some cases, 
official assumptions are taken for granted [by media], but even when they are challenged by sponsors of 
alternative packages [i.e. anti-nuclear supporters, note by bp], it is these competitors that bear the burden 
                                                      
12 http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/fl20110703rp.html 
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of proof. A weaker form of this argument is that journalists make official packages the starting point for 
discussing an issue”.  
News media appeared keen to exercise censorship, for example by blatantly ignoring the new 
movements and their messages; by listing anti-nuclear NGO organizations such as CNIC only as a 
contact for tracking down missing persons and refraining from reporting their activities (it took the 
Yomiuri Shinbun two months to feature CNIC in a ‘hard news’ piece on a panel discussion); by providing, 
as noted above, remarkably poor coverage of protest demonstrations which international observers found 
on the contrary very newsworthy; by skipping uncomfortable details about the role of the police at such 
demonstrations13; or simply by failing to exercise criticism and to press interviewees to answer hard 
questions. Such selection of ‘worthy’ topics and the devoicing of non-institutional (non-legitimized) 
sources in turn construe the events as insignificant and the audience as uninterested in positions outside 
those of the dominant discourse.  
The Yomiuri Shinbun offered another example of this subtle conformism in an editorial of 29 
September 2011 in which it first reported the results of a survey by the Japan Atomic Energy 
Commission—presumably a body with no revolutionary agenda—showing that 98% of the responses 
called for the abolishment of nuclear power plants, but then concluding, with no additional comment, that 
this figure could not reflect public opinion. The editorial then juxtaposes this with the paper’s own 
surveys, showing the decline of support for the abolition of nuclear plants from 65% in July, to 56% in 
September, and concludes that “there is much confusion regarding public opinion”. Besides the 
questionable method in presenting statistics in this fashion (with no indication of the sampling method, 
the exact questions, etc.) or the deceiving oversimplification of responses, likely to be complex outcomes 
of possibly ambivalent stances (Gamson and Modigliani 1989:35), it is unclear how such unqualified 
statements may dispel such confusion.  
In an article purportedly aimed at producing a self-assessment of the paper’s performance in 
the 7 months since the incident, on 15 October 2011 the Asahi Shinbun publishes an interview with 
Shiseido honorary Chair Fukuhara Yoshiharu (福原義春), presented as a qualified authority for his being a 
‘long-term fan’ of the paper, having also served on the paper’s editorial monitoring commission (朝日新
聞紙面審議会委員) until March 2011. The article is a good example of the tame and inconclusive 
argumentation style (and ‘critiques’) of Japanese media, consistent as they are with a dominant rhetorical 
strategy14 of balanced consideration of all parties’ position. On one hand, Fukuhara appears to criticize 
the paper for not offering a more complex picture of the effects of the earthquake on wider segments of 
the population: those whose work was affected perhaps to a lesser degree by debris which was not being 
cleared, or having to work in appalling conditions, but then concludes by wondering philosophically 
about the paper’s right to judge: how can one assess whether the impact on individual lives was 
permanent or just transitory? A paper’s mission is indeed to aid the reconstruction, but—he 
counters—after all some resent being perpetually represented as victims. With regards to the accusation 
of running only pieces based on the government or TEPCO’s communiqués, which recalled war-time 
reports by the Imperial General Headquarters, Fukuhara acknowledges that the public may have felt 
betrayed by TEPCO’s censorship of the meltdown, but then defends the paper’s predicament: if data was 
not available otherwise, what can you do? Finally, with regards to the view that in spite of its commitment 
to showcase pro- and anti-nuclear voices the paper was excessively timid in its analyses and forecasts, 
Fukuhara candidly states that it was impossible to find a trustworthy (shinrai dekiru) scientist to speak on 
the matter, that the extreme slogans of the nuclear supporters’ “it’s all fine” or the anti-nuclear supporters 
“it’s dangerous” are problematic, and the paper has a duty to show a broader variety of voices—a 
statement with which few could disagree, but was hardly demonstrated in the paper’s line, as shown by 
the figures quoted at the beginning of this section on public rallies in the capital. It was here that the 
biggest variety of voices became audible, including intellectuals, artists, scientists, political activists and 
ordinary citizens from all walks of life.   
The constraints on journalistic freedom that the Japanese press agency system, with the 
unavoidable partisanship that the dedicated press-rooms entail, has been long criticised. Not only the 
traditional news media play a crucial role in determining which events are newsworthy; the close 
proximity of journalists and institutional sources also hinders fairness of access, and simply reproduces 
the same hierarchies of social voices. To reclaim such voice, the philosopher Karatani Kōjin (who, having 
                                                      
13 cf. http://www.fccj.or.jp/node/6921 
14 cf. Pizziconi 2009 on the cooperative (as opposed to competitive) frame that appears to regulate ethnographic 
interview discussions in Japanese.  
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lost trust in the Japanese press, notably chose to speak at the Foreign Press Club, 29 September 2011, 
http://www.fccj.or.jp/node/6921) urged his fellow citizens to become a society which can demonstrate15, 
putting the finger on the crucial and rather broad issues of a culture of engagement, scrutiny of the 
authorities, and human rights in Japanese society.  
 
5. New voices and new themes: the internet and social media 
To state that media discourse produced a unanimous voice is of course an unacceptable oversimplification, 
but the wide availability of internet and mobile phones (which far exceeds that in Europe) now ensures 
that the bottleneck effect of official newsmedia can be bypassed, and top-down control of news and 
knowledge becomes increasingly difficult. Anti-nuclear scientists (and other social commentators) like 
Koide Hiroaki have published about the nuclear issue for decades, but their public appearances can now 
achieve wider and almost limitless circulation by simply uploading a youtube clip to a blog. Twitter or 
Facebook were instrumental (where electricity and internet connections were still available) in providing 
minute-by-minute updates of missing people’s whereabouts, latest transport news, etc. but also in 
mobilizing protest, generating new alliances, and eventually boosting the circulation of less time-bound 
themes, as we will see below. This digital communication enables communities of interest to emerge 
independently from other forms of association (geographical, professional, etc.) which rely on more 
conventional channels of communication (face-to-face encounters, professional literature, etc.), give 
access to different actors, and can, in a bottom-up fashion, challenge the dominant narrative.  
Not all agree however on their transformative potential: Karatani Kōjin, commenting on the 
role of Twitter in mobilizing participation16, disregards it as a merely virtual experience that can be, for 
that reason, easily dismissed by authorities, and one that has little in common with the real, shared 
experience of a public demonstration. Twitter communication is quantitatively poor, being limited to 140 
characters. Knowledge formation requires more than sound bites; it requires scope as well as depth, 
which is why the traditional newsmedia still have an important role to play. However to the extent that 
new technologies overcome some of the constraints posed by the traditional power relations, they are 
potentially subversive and more democratic. Networking through Twitter, blogs, Facebook – and the 
boundless reproduction and circulation of information that these allow – provides a life-line to grass-root 
movements and a previously unthinkable visibility.  
For example, a group of citizens based in Koenji, Tokyo, known as “Amateur protest” (Shirōto 
no ran) was credited with organizing the main demonstration in Tokyo on 6 June 201117, allegedly 
attended by 15,000~20,000 protesters. The spirit of the group can be evinced by the profusion of graphic 
material posted for circulation on their website, much of which plays on the theme of utter distrust for 
official institutions (cf. FIGURE 7). The language is plain, and ‘emotional’ (cf. the evaluative adjectives 
abuneee! Osoroshii!), and their visual strategies, exceptional for not recurring to the usual trope of 
cuteness, have an all the more dramatic effect.  
 
                                                      
15 see the video of the demonstration on http://peacemedia.jp/topics/110911speach.html 
16 http://www.cyzo.com/2011/10/post_8675.html 
17 http://611shinjuku.tumblr.com/, and Tan (2011-12). 
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FIGURE 7: posters graphics from Shirōto no ran website 
 
The theme of distrust recurs endlessly in the discourse of anti-nuclear movements, as is the open 
accusation of the establishment for the spreading of uso (lies) or shinwa (myths).  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8: “safe? green? we won’t be fooled again” (from Shirōto no ran’s website) 
 
This distrust, far from being an irrational and groundless emotional response, is fuelled by a claim to the 
legitimacy of concern for human values—a concern neglected by scientific discourse. Returning for a 
moment to the studies in risk theory, these show that while indeed lay and expert assessments of risks 
(including those posed by nuclear power) generally differ, contrary to common belief, lay assessments are 
equally consistent and rational, and in fact more ‘textured’ than those of the experts. Parkins and Halusa 
(2011:4) note that “whereas technical experts base their judgments on probabilities of harm or estimates 
of annual fatalities, lay people base their judgments on a sense that the risks threaten things they value, 
such as future generations, stability, or the capacity to control technology” (2011:5). Crucially, if the 
notion of risk involves an assessment of human values18, a science that ignores the human values at the 
core of these judgments is seriously misguided. The Fukushima disaster catalysed experiences that 
affected people’s lives and to which people were able to relate in an unmediated way: the mass 
evacuations, the danger of food contamination, the parents’ dilemma about how to protect their children19 
                                                      
18 They quote a definition by Rohrmann and Renn (2000), where risk is “understood as the possibility that human 
actions, situations or events might lead to consequences that affect aspects of what humans value” (Parkins and 
Haluza-Delay (2011:14).  
19 The Mainichi Shinbun of 16 October 2011 carried an interview with novelist Kanahara Hitomi, in which she 
admitted having fled Tokyo and moved to Okayama the day after the disaster, and spoke of parents’ distress for being 
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in the face of the invisible nuclear threat. This made public opinion less reliant on media or corporate 
discourses. This is evidenced by the circulation of alternative metaphors on the nuclear such as the ‘toire 
no nai manshion’ (a building whose waste products cannot be disposed of)20, and various other war-time 
images, countering the old disassociation of military and civil uses of the nuclear. Murakami Haruki, for 
example, speaking at a public rally, condemned his country’s failure to say no to the nuclear in 1945, 
when Japan experienced the “scars” left by radiation “on the world and human wellbeing” (Japan Times, 
June 1121). Quite explicitly he attacked the government and utility companies’ priority on "efficiency" and 
"convenience", which marginalised opponents as “unrealistic dreamers", thus reclaiming human beings’ 
“right to dream”.  
The climate of uncertainty and huge anxiety that the country had to endure could not leave the 
children unaffected. How could Japan explain to its children, inevitably exposed to the relentless 
drumming of bulletins on the crippled reactor, the terrifying prospective scenarios? Once again a reaction 
came through digital media. The artist Hachiya Kazuhiko (known for works aimed at marrying art and 
science) began to issue a number of tweets, later collected and edited in a short anime which appeared on 
Youtube less then a week after the incident, explaining the still unfolding events through the light-hearted 
humour of a scatological metaphor. The power plant is once again personified by cute character 
Genpatsukun,  
 
 
 
FIGURE 9: Genpatsu-kun has a stomachache 
 
Following the incident, Genpatsu-kun has developed a stomachache, and now needs to relieve himself. 
His poo is very smelly, and if it leaked everyone would be in trouble! An explosion is heard, but no 
worries, it was just a little wind. Doctors (the rescue teams at the plant) keep giving it medicine: a bit 
more wind is coming out but this smell soon disappears so people who live far away “won’t even notice”. 
Palliative as the video’s intent may be, it is difficult not to spot the limits of the metaphor. Some worry 
that the smell should remain forever, but this is not true: “it will go in one week”. The narrative even 
includes some reference to the fact that doctors treating Genpatsu-kun’s dangerous poo are actually at risk 
(inochi ga abunakunaru), that nobody knows how to dispose of that poo, and that disposal is very costly, 
but all these messages are packaged in a constellation of reassuring semiotic signs: apart from the sedate 
anthromorphism of the anime, there is an up-tempo soundtrack, “cute” characters, the intermixing of 
plain-style utterances and modal particles, which characterize down-to-earth, informal speech.  
Anime are quite common pedagogical tools in Japanese visual culture, and certainly not 
exclusively targeting young children. The need to assuage children’s anguish justifies, no doubt, the 
patent fallaciousness of some statements, but the package does bring to mind the corporate pro-nuclear 
videos, as the considerate sanitization of the message eventually excuses the plant, that has “given us a lot 
                                                                                                                                                              
caught between an expectation of loyalty to their communities and the wish to protect their children (available at: 
http://ratio.sakura.ne.jp/archives/2011/10/17214029/). 
20 http://www.newsweekjapan.jp/column/ikeda/2012/10/post-575.php, and see a blogger’s environmentalist (and 
patriotic) reflection on the meaning of the metaphor: (s)he suggests that nuclear plants are like a foreign building 
which cannot withstand the tremors of Japanese earthquakes. The nuclear manshion does not suit Japan and its 
earthquakes, so “let’s enjoy old-fashioned relaxing Japanese wooden homes, and chill out with a fan in your hand that 
is suitable to our climate. The story of three little pigs does not suit the Japanese.” 
(http://ameblo.jp/aonoshinbrain2/entry-10954063171.html). 
21 http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110611a2.html 
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of electricity until now”. That reassuring manga-like characters were exploited against the angst of the 
time is perhaps not surprising. 
In spite of the dismissive comments by many observers about the role of Twitter in the 
formation of a new public consciousness, and the virtual volatility of public opinion channelled through it, 
it is notable that this channel generated a somewhat more persistent phenomenon, such as the character 
Monju-kun. Monju is the name of a fast breeder reactor in Fukui prefecture famous for a plethora of 
accidents, which saw it produce electricity for a single hour since the beginning of the tests in 1986. 
Monju-kun presents himself as a reformed nuclear worker: after the Fukushima incident, he became 
aware of his own riskiness and deceit and now wants “to quit working”. This fictional character now 
writes books, gives interviews, and even has his very own idiolect – the cute “desudayo”. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Monju-kun on the pages of Gendai yoogo no kiso chishiki 2013 special edition 
 
In the special issue of Gendai yoogo no kiso chishiki (現代用語の基礎知識 2013 号外版) Monju-kun 
presents his ‘educational’ objectives. He argues that speaking on Twitter was necessary in order to spread 
“information” that could become “food for thought”, because people were afraid but also afraid to admit 
they were afraid, and needed to start talking about it. Monju-kun draws his ‘knowledge’ from publicly 
available sources such as The Fukui Shinbun（福井新聞), Kahoku Shinpo（河北新報）or others, but “he” 
makes an effort to explain them simply for the general public. He distrusts institutional media, and 
recommends an exercise: comparing various newspapers (Mainichi, Asahi, Yomiuri, Tokyo Shinbun) to 
spot the bias inherent in every account. He admits that one cannot change the world by Tweeting in 140 
characters, but because he wants to offer his simple and positive vision to grown-ups and children alike, 
he has now released three publications, with graphs and illustrations.  
Monju-kun clearly apes his predecessor Pluto-kun (of the pro-nuclear campaign) and like 
Pluto-kun presents itself in reassuring, familiarly cute looks, but the subversive nature of this ‘cute’ 
reference in the context of the disaster did not go unnoticed22, and far from just mollifying the message, 
sarcastically challenged the narrative of unlimited progress. 
The magnitude of the catastrophe and the articulate multiplicity of discourses, metaphors, and 
imagery that have been mobilized in response to it and that I have described in the sections above have 
stirred and no doubt will continue to stir very big questions about the values that Japanese society will 
pursue in the future. In my closing remarks, I offer a brief reflection on this.  
 
6. Japanese culture, and concluding remarks 
On the 5th July 2012 a parliamentary report 23  by the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 
Committee’s was submitted to both houses of the Japanese Diet. The executive summary by chairman 
Kiyoshi Kurokawa’s opened with the statement that “the […] accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Plant cannot be regarded as a natural disaster. It was a profoundly manmade disaster – that could 
and should have been foreseen and prevented.” More critically however, it goes on to qualify the nature 
of this human responsibility with the following statement, not included in the Japanese version:  
“For all the extensive detail it provides, what this report cannot fully convey – especially to a global 
audience – is the mindset that supported the negligence behind this disaster. 
                                                      
22 cf. Hirabayashi Keito’ blog on the appearance of Monju-kun’s mascot at a demonstration in Harajuku, Tokyo: 
http://www.dianuke.org/pluto-kun-vs-monju-kun-science-and-the-mayors/ 
23  downloadable at http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/index.html. Some extracts are 
available from the BBC post: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18718486 
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What must be admitted – very painfully – is that this was a disaster “Made in Japan.” Its fundamental 
causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our 
reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our 
insularity. 
Had other Japanese been in the shoes of those who bear responsibility for this accident, the result may 
well have been the same.” (bp’s italics).  
While the Japanese version made reference to “50 years of one-party rule, mass employment for new 
graduates, the seniority system, life-time employment” (一党支配と、新卒一括採用、年功序列、終身雇用) 
and a Japanese “mindset” which “took all of that for granted”, the English version, arguably striving to 
contextualize the accident for the global audience, refers, surprisingly candidly, if not brutally, to the 
collective conceit of a powerful financial elite and bureaucracy and the lack of public accountability, the 
prioritization of organizational interest at the expense of public interest, and a cover-up culture. But the 
reference to the “cultural causes” of the catastrophe (as well as the explicit declaration that the report did 
not seek to “lay blame”, but to “learn from the disaster”) literally enraged the protesters. Among these, 
Nobel Prize Ōe Kenzaburō, called the report’s reference to the Japanese culture a cop-out24, which left 
individual responsibility unquestioned. 
Lack of public scrutiny and accountability, a cosy relationship between government agencies 
and nuclear industry, lax regulation that does not put the citizens’ interest first, are not unique features of 
the Japanese system. But the discourses that supports pro- or anti-nuclear stances and policies are 
nevertheless liable to broader cultural conventions, including notions of deference or challenge to power, 
the importance of and the modalities of consensus-building, the scope of acceptable topics of 
conversation, and so on.  Social media and other forms of bottom-up communication (the production 
and circulation of information) have a huge subversive potential, but this potential is subordinated to 
citizens’ willingness to become more engaged, to openly challenge the dominant discourse, and reshape 
the terms of the debate. Culture, including energy culture and life-style, is not created directly by 
institutions, but indirectly by discourses. This is because images, texts, information and their sources do 
not carry meaning independently, but are interpreted against the backdrop of the ideological stances that 
the viewers inhabit, which are in an interdependent relationship with the social context, affecting it (as 
public opinion) and being affected by it (through, for example, exposure to media discourses, active 
political engagement, etc.). It is because of this that images of demonstrators may be received as a merely 
fatalist, touchy-feely attack on the rigour of scientific discourse, or as a legitimate demand for human 
rights and mass empowerment. Japan’s future policies will be profoundly affected by the nature of the 
discourse on the nuclear that ordinary Japanese citizen will be able to create and sustain, or their ability to 
marshal different values against those of the industry. The crucial buzz-words of safe or green have begun 
to take on bitter sarcastic nuances which force their disassociation from the interpretive packages of the 
pro-nuclear discourse. Others, like hibaku, are evoking associations with a past, which Japan had hoped 
to forget.   
What we have witnessed since March 2011 is a battle for the power over knowledge and 
information, a re-conquering, by ordinary citizens, of the semiotic fields surrounding the nuclear. 
Whether this new discursive context—the new voices emerged in the wake of the disaster through the 
levelling networks of digital communication, the new narratives on human experience, human rights, 
public accountability, distrust in the authority—will lead to more enduring predispositions and a demise 
of the belief in the inevitability of nuclear power for social progress, only time will tell. Spontaneous, 
small-scale, often non-ideological grass-root movements have existed throughout Japanese post-war 
history, but have often had only local resonance. The magnitude of the Fukushima disaster gave the 
themes of the movements a national—and global—relevance, and its critical, alternative narratives a 
more powerful significance. The psychological conflict between multiple narratives never has predictable 
outcomes: a general support for the discourse of progress and development may conflict with local 
concerns about cleanness and safety, and generate the ambivalent stance called “not-in-my-backyard”. 
But a discursive field with the potential for restructuring a political space tainted with corruption, 
corporate interests and utter disregard for human experience has been created in the wake of the 
Fukushima disaster, and this, at least, can only be a positive step forward for Japan’s democracy.  
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